Blast-remediation requirements for blast resistant windows, bullet proof windows and blast proof buildings are usually linked with the bombings of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on Sep. 11, 2001. These attacks to our homeland, in reality, have been tracked by our own armed forces and the FBI since the early 1980's, starting with the 1983 U.S. Beirut embassy car bombing. The 9-11 tragedies in New York and at the Pentagon accelerated the process for the United States Federal Government to strengthen its buildings in order to protect the citizens of our nation. The General Service Administration (GSA) in 1995 had conducted a survey of 1239 buildings to assess risk factors for these buildings and had proposed a citation to protect these buildings from terrorist threats including bomb blasts. The risk assessment of these buildings ultimately resulted in a protection level matrix to help define the hazards and appropriate protection levels to each building, wherein a protection level 1 for a building represents the building has sustained and fully survived a bomb blast, such that the glass is not cracked and no window/glass/frame fragments are in either the inside or outside building structure. A protection level 5 for a building represents the windows and window frames failed catastrophically.
As it stands there is no single blast-remediation standard. GSA has a testing criterion and test protocol, but not a standard for blast mitigation. DOD uses the UFC 2003 recommendation, which stipulates a minimum of 7 KPA (1 psi) protection for all buildings with a standoff distance of 82 feet, and higher blast loads when the building is located less than 82 feet. All agencies of the federal government do accept the shock tube and the arena test methods as a way to verify compliance.
There remains a need for a blast-proof window system that has a minimum blast mitigation recommendation of at least 2.5 psi protection for a multi-storied building by the DOD. The blast-proof window system would include a novel and improved blast-resistant mullion in use with a blast-resistant and bullet-proof pressure bar member, both being made from a aluminum alloy 6063-T6. Additionally, the mullion and the pressure bar member would include serrated surfaces such that the blast-resistant mullion, the pressure bar member and the bullet-proof laminated windows are permanently locked together using a structural silicone adhesive thereon for forming the blast-proof window system of the present invention.